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DEARLY DEPARTED: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
DEPARTURE BAR UNDER MENDIOLA V. HOLDER AND
WILLIAM V. GONZALES
Daniel E. Bonilla*

I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 29, 2009, Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
officials removed1 then-green-card holder Vakhtang Pruidze based on
a state conviction for possession of a controlled substance.2 Thirteen
days later, the state court set aside the conviction, and Pruidze moved
to reopen3 his removal proceedings.4 The Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA or “Board”), however, denied the motion because Pruidze
no longer physically resided in the United States, and thus the BIA held
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion.5 Ultimately, however, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the BIA cannot
constrict its statutory jurisdiction based on the Attorney General’s
regulations or its own decisions.6
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2005,
University of Louisville. I would like to thank Professor Lori Nessel for her guidance
throughout the development of this Comment, Megan Bedell for her invaluable
suggestions and assistance, and the Law Review members who helped prepare this
Comment for publication.
1 Until the passing of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996, the term “deportation” referred to aliens who had
been removed from the country. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-587–
89 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C. (2006)); see Jennifer M.
Chacon, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 140 n.28
(2009).
IIRIRA consolidated the then-separate “exclusion” and “deportation”
proceedings under one all-encompassing label of “removal” proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. §
1324c(e) (2006); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1546(a), 1015(e)–(f) (2006).
2 Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 235 (6th Cir. 2011).
3 “A motion to reopen is based on ‘facts or evidence not available at the time of the
original decision’ [and] must be supported by affidavits or other evidence.” RACHEL E.
ROSENBLOOM ET AL., CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND INT’L JUSTICE AT BOSTON COLL., POSTDEPARTURE MOTIONS TO REOPEN OR RECONSIDER 2 (2010), available at
http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/humanrights/pdf/MTRPracticeAdvis
ory2010FINAL_APPENDIX.pdf (quoting Patel v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 610, 612 (7th Cir.
2004)); see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B) (2006).
4 Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 235.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 237–38.

On May 7, 2004, the BIA, within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction,
granted Rafael Martinez Coyt thirty days to depart the United States
voluntarily.7 By fault of his former attorney, however, Coyt did not
learn of the court’s ruling until October 2004.8 After being removed,
Coyt filed a motion for the BIA to reissue the decision in order to grant
a new voluntary departure period.9 The BIA denied the motion on
grounds that Coyt’s motion had been withdrawn once he departed the
country.10 After reviewing the regulation at issue, the Ninth Circuit
held that a motion is not withdrawn when the alien has been
involuntarily removed.11
On April 9, 2009, DHS officials removed Jesus ContrerasBocanegra after the BIA denied his motion to cancel his removal.12
Thereafter, Contreras filed a timely motion to reopen based on
ineffective assistance of counsel.13 Once again, the BIA denied
Contreras’s motion; this time, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction
due to his departure.14 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that based
on its prior rulings, the regulation at issue divests the BIA of
jurisdiction to entertain such motions, even when they are timely.15
The above-referenced cases are only three examples of how
different circuit courts of appeals interpret post-departure bars under
the Code of Federal Regulations. For example, immigrants who have
been subjected to removal proceedings in New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Indiana, or Maryland, but are currently residing in another country, are
permitted to file motions to reopen regardless of whether they are
currently the subject of removal proceedings or whether the U.S.
government has already removed them.16 Even immigrants who have
Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 904.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 907.
12 Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1170, 1170–71 (10th Cir. 2010).
13 Id. at 1171.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1172.
16 The Third Circuit, which includes New Jersey, held that the regulatory postdeparture bar conflicts with Congress’s clear intent regarding motions to reopen.
Espinal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 224 (3d Cir. 2011). The Second Circuit, of
which New York is a part, has held that the BIA cannot constrict its own jurisdiction.
Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2011). The court in Luna, however, limited its
holding to statutory motions. Id. at 102. Ohio is located within the Sixth Circuit’s
jurisdiction and permits aliens to file motions to reopen their proceedings after they
have departed because the court has ruled that the BIA cannot constrict its statutory
jurisdiction by regulations or its own decisions. Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 235,
237–38 (6th Cir. 2011). Indiana, which is within the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction,
7
8
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been subjected to removal proceedings in Alaska but are currently
living in another country, so long as their removal was involuntarily
and/or they are not currently subject to removal proceedings, may file
a motion to reopen.17 Unfortunately, the regulatory departure bar
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) prohibits immigrants who have been
subjected to removal proceedings in Maine, Texas, Colorado, or
Florida, among other states, from moving to reopen their proceedings
once they have departed the country.18 This Comment sets forth that
such inconsistent interpretations of federal law and regulations
threaten to undermine the important concepts of uniformity and just
application of law in American jurisprudence.
The lack of uniformity in application of the departure bar is of
increasing concern due to the growing annual number of removed
aliens in recent years.19 In fiscal year 2010, 392,862 aliens were
removed,20 more than double the number of removals in 1999.21 The
continuous increase in the number of immigrants removed each year
emphasizes the significant implications stemming from the fact that
permits aliens to file motions to reopen or reconsider for the same reasons articulated
in the Sixth Circuit. Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 2010).
Maryland, which is within the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction, permits aliens to file
motions to reopen pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) regardless of whether they
are physically present in the United States. William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 333 (4th
Cir. 2007).
17 Alaska, which falls within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, permits an alien to
reopen a case pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) if the alien moves to reopen after
the removal order is final or after being involuntarily removed. Coyt v. Holder, 593
F.3d 902, 905–07 (9th Cir. 2010); Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2007).
18 Each state falls under the jurisdictions of the First, Fifth, Tenth, or Eleventh
Circuits, respectively. See Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th
Cir. 2010); Mendiola v Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1311 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 502 (2010); Ovalles v. Holder, 577 F.3d 288, 295–96 (5th Cir. 2009) (relying upon
Navarro-Miranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2003)); Sankar v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
284 F. App’x 798, 799 (11th Cir. 2008); Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438, 441–42
(1st Cir. 2007); Ablahad v. Gonzales, 217 F. App’x 470, 475 n.6 (6th Cir. 2007).
19 See generally Christina LaBrie, Lack of Uniformity in the Deportation of Criminal
Aliens, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357 (1999) (describing different aspects of the
interplay between federal immigration law and state criminal law).
20 Stephen Dinan, More Criminal Aliens Deported Last Year, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2010, at A1; see also Anthony M. DeStefano, Deportations Rise Under Obama, NEWSDAY,
Aug. 2, 2010, at A32.
21 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS
95
(2009),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/ois_yb_2008.pdf
(noting that there were 183,114 deportations in 1999). See generally Lenni B. Benson,
Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process
Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37 (2007)
(discussing how litigation has increased in light of Congress’s narrowing and
elimination of prior forms of relief).
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immigrants unfortunate enough to have resided in particular states in
the United States will be forever barred from reopening their cases,
despite valid grounds for doing so.
The situation is further compounded by the fact that most
criminal convictions result in mandatory detention.22 Such a practice,
in conjunction with the rising number of deportations, raises new
concerns. For example, in Mendiola v. Holder, DHS officials transferred
the petitioner, Mendiola, to an immigration detention facility in
another circuit court’s jurisdiction.23 The immigration judge (IJ)
denied Mendiola’s motion for a change of venue,24 and, ultimately, the
court denied his motion to reopen due to the regulatory postdeparture bar, which deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear the
motion.25 This practice implicates serious concerns for aliens facing
removal proceedings in this country because DHS officials, or
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents, can transfer an
alien to a jurisdiction that is more favorable to their position;26 as a
practical matter, DHS officials can engage in forum shopping.27
In order to ensure that litigants are afforded adequate legal
protections, the Legislature has created several safeguards in the
judicial system. For instance, the United States Supreme Court
recently noted in Kucana v. Holder that “[t]he motion to reopen is an
‘important safeguard’ intended ‘to ensure a proper and lawful
disposition’ of immigration proceedings.”28 Courts should not subject
such an important legal right to chance—a chance that a deportable
alien lives in a jurisdiction that permits him or her to file a motion to
22 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 389 (2002) (“Furthermore, Congress has
ordered the mandatory detention of most non-citizens whose criminal convictions
render them deportable.”).
23 Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1305 (10th Cir. 2009); Mendiola v. Gonzales,
189 F. App’x 810, 812 (10th Cir. 2006).
24 Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 812.
25 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1311.
26 Id.
27 See RICHARD L. SKINNER, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES RELATED TO DETAINEE TRANSFERS 1 (2009), available
at
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc
=1016%7C6715%7C16871%7C31048%7C30690 (“ICE transfers detainees to other
detention facilities to prepare for final removal, reduce overcrowding, or meet the
specialized needs of the detainee.”). An alien’s counsel may also engage in forum
shopping, as noted by Judge Bea of the Ninth Circuit. Immigration Litigation Reduction:
Hearing on H.R. 109-537 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 49 8 (2006)
(statement of the Honorable Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals).
28 Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 834 (2010) (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S.
1, 18 (2008)).
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reopen after departing the country. Because “this conflict involves an
issue of significant practical importance,”29 it is imperative that the
immigration courts provide uniformity in the application of the
regulatory departure bar throughout the country.
It is also clear that Congress’s intent in enacting the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA)30 was
to make motions to reopen available to immigrants inside and outside
of the country.31 This Comment proposes that Congress should modify
the INA to include language clearly indicating that an alien’s
geographic location at the time of filing of a motion to reopen or
reconsider removal proceedings should not bar the immigration courts
of jurisdiction to hear such motions. Ultimately, this Comment
concludes that amending the INA’s statutory language to explicitly
grant immigration courts the jurisdiction to consider an alien’s motion
to reopen regardless of whether the alien is within or without the
country would provide uniformity in this context by resolving the
current circuit conflicts while also remaining true to the IIRIRA’s
statutory purpose. Part II of this Comment begins with background
information on the history of immigration law in the United States by
discussing the INA before the IIRIRA’s enactment in 1996. Part III
focuses on the state of immigration law after the IIRIRA’s enactment.
In Part IV, this Comment provides a brief overview of three BIA cases,
each of which address different departure bar issues. This Part
provides insight into some of the background matters that are
analyzed in the circuit cases discussed throughout this Comment. Part
V analyzes the Fourth Circuit’s William v. Gonzales and the Ninth
Circuit’s recent decision in Mendiola v. Holder. In addition, this Part
illustrates the lack of uniformity in U.S. circuit courts of appeals by
noting the differences in departure bar jurisprudence found in several
different cases. Then, Part VI provides an argument for modification or
abolishment of the regulatory departure bars. Lastly, Part VII
discusses possible solutions to the lack of uniformity by proposing an
amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) that would render all
currently phrased regulatory departure bars invalid and thus
29 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 20, Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303 (10th
Cir. 2009) ( No. 08-9565), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/07/09-1378_pet.pdf.
30 Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C. (2006)).
31 See Reyes-Torres v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (“‘The intent of
Congress is clear’ in that ‘Congress anticipated that petitioners would be able to pursue
relief after departing from the United States.’”) (quoting Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902,
906 (9th Cir. 2010)).

105

inapplicable to departed aliens who file motions to reopen their
proceedings.
II. THE HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION LAW BEFORE IIRIRA
This Comment provides the historical background behind the
origins of the regulatory departure bars to better illustrate their
current varying interpretations. Congress enacted the first general
immigration statute in 1882, which “imposed a head tax of 50 cents
[per immigrant] and excluded idiots, lunatics, convicts, and persons
likely to become a public charge.”32 Also in 1882, Congress passed the
controversial Chinese Exclusion Act.33 A codification of the general
immigration law occurred in 1891,34 and by 1893, Congress enacted a
provision for the establishment of boards to determine the
admissibility of arriving immigrants.35 By 1903, the legislature revised
the statutory provisions to enumerate rejections of certain types of
immigrants.36 In 1907, Congress added additional exclusions for the
feebleminded and persons who had committed crimes involving moral
turpitude, among others.37 Essentially, Congress aimed to disallow
certain types of individuals whom Congress deemed to be of unsound
mind or character from entering the United States.
Also in 1907, Congress created the Dillingham Commission to
investigate the immigration system of the United States.38 Although
the commission’s report included recommendations to improve the
country’s immigration system, Congress did not adopt any such
legislation until 1917 when it passed a comprehensive revision of the
32 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.02[2] (2010); see Act of
Aug. 3, 1882, 22 Stat. 214.
33 Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealed by the Magnuson Act, ch.
344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600 (1943) (prohibiting the immigration of Chinese Laborers in the
United States); see Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination
and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 29 (1998) (“The Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882 was the first Asian Exclusion Law, and the one that generated
sthe most contemporary controversy.”).
34 While Congress and different states had already enacted legislation relating to
immigration prior to 1891, see Sheila Jackson Lee, Why Immigration Reform Requires a
Comprehensive Approach That Includes Both Legalization Programs and Provisions to
Secure the Border, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 267, 268–69 (2006), the codification in 1891
“provided the first general immigration law applying to all aliens entering the United
States,” Marian L. Smith, The INS and the Singular Status of North American Indians, 21
AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RESEARCH J. 131, 146 (1997).
35 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 32.
36 See Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213 (repealed 1907) excluding
epileptics, insane persons, professional beggars, and anarchists, among others).
37 See Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898.
38 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 32.
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immigration laws over the veto of President Wilson.39
This
comprehensive revision expanded the powers of immigration officers
and conferred discretionary authority to admit certain barred
groups.40 After World War I ended in 1918, immigration began to rise
in the United States, with some years registering over a million
immigrants per year.41 This influx of immigrants ultimately resulted in
the Quota Law of 1921.42
The Acts of 1917 and 1921 were the primary components of
immigration policy until the Alien Registration Act of 1940, which
expanded the Attorney General’s power.43 This Act delegated to the
Attorney General “broad authority to establish rules and regulations to
enforce the nation’s immigration laws.”44 Pursuant to regulations, the
Attorney General established the BIA in 1940; the regulations
“authorized the Board to ‘issue orders of deportation’; ‘consider and
determine appeals’; and resolve motions for ‘reconsideration,
reargument or reopening of a case after the issuance of a final
decision.’”45 Then, in 1952, Congress enacted the INA, also known as
the McCarran-Walter Act.46 The INA further expanded the Attorney
General’s authority by granting the Attorney General the power to
administer and enforce the Act.47 It also “authorized him to ‘establish
Id.
Id.
41 Id.
42 Act of May 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, 42 Stat. 5(placing numerical limitations on
how many immigrants of certain nationalities could be permitted in the United States),
repealed by Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 279 (1952).
43 Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. (2006)), amended by Internal Security Act of
1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987.
44 Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 661 (2d Cir. 2010).
45 Id. at 654–55; see Regulations Governing Departmental Organization and
Authority,
5
Fed.
Reg.
3502,
3503
(Sept. 4, 1940). In 1913, the immigration-related federal agency established in 1891
was transferred to the newly created Department of Labor and divided
into the Bureau of Immigration and the Bureau of Naturalization. The
two bureaus were combined in 1933 . . . and . . . named the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) . . . . [In] March 2003, the functions of
the INS were transferred to DHS.
Zhang, 617 F.3d at 655 n.3 (citations omitted). The provisions established under the
Alien Registration Act were further enlarged by the Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub.
L. No. 81-831, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (codified as amended in scattered section of 50
U.S.C.).
46 Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C.). The Act was co-named after its sponsors Senator Pat McCarran and
Congressman Francis Walter. Richard Boswell, Immigration Law: Crafting True
Immigration Reform, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 7, 8–9 (2008).
47 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 655.
39
40
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such regulations . . . as he deem[ed] necessary for carrying out [that]
authority.’”48 Subsequently, the “Attorney General promulgated a
series of regulations defining the ‘[a]ppellate jurisdiction’ of the BIA
and the ‘[p]owers of the Board.’”49 Regulations promulgated at this
time included motions to reopen and motions for reconsideration of
Board decisions.50 More importantly, these regulations also included
the first version of the regulatory departure bar, which stated that “[a]
motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on
behalf of a person who is the subject of deportation proceedings
subsequent to his departure from the United States.”51
In the 1954 case In re G-y-B, the BIA upheld the departure bar as a
jurisdictional limitation of its power to consider a motion to reopen.52
The Board’s holding clearly validated the regulatory departure bar.
Then, in 1958, the Attorney General revised the regulations to include
sua sponte authority for the BIA to reopen proceedings and reconsider
its own decisions.53 Congress also made changes by amending the INA
in 1961 to include provisions relating to judicial review of BIA
decisions.54 One such provision modeled the regulatory departure bar
and stated that “[a]n order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be
reviewed by any court if the alien . . . has departed from the United
States after the issuance of the order.”55 Congress’s amendment
codified the departure bar.56
The Attorney General’s regulations pertaining to motions to
reopen remained unchanged until the Immigration Act of 1990.57 This
Act authorized the Attorney General to
48

173).

8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2006); Zhang, 617 F.3d at 655 (quoting § 103(a), 66 Stat. at

49 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 655 (quoting Immigration and Nationality Regulations, 17
Fed. Reg. 11,469, 11,475 (Dec. 19, 1952) (final rule codified at 8 C.F.R. § 6.1(b), (d)
(1952)).
50 8 C.F.R. § 6.2 (1952); see Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656 n.4.
51 Immigration and Nationality Regulations, 17 Fed. Reg. at 11,475 (originally
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 6.2 (1952)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2011) (containing an
identical current limit on motions to reopen and reconsider exclusion, deportation, or
removal proceedings before the BIA); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2011) (containing an
identical current limit on motions to reopen and reconsider exclusion, deportation, or
removal proceedings before an IJ); Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656.
52 6 I. & N. Dec. 159, 160 (B.I.A. 1954).
53 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656.
54 Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650 (repealed 1996); see Zhang,
617 F.3d at 656.
55 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1964) (repealed 1996); see Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656.
56 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656; see 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c).
57 Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 545(d)(1), 104 Stat. 4978; see Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656.
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issue regulations with respect to . . . the period of time in which
motions to reopen . . . may be offered in deportation proceedings,
which regulations [should] include a limitation on the number of
such motions that may be filed and a maximum time period for the
filing of such motions.58

Ultimately, the Attorney General followed this directive and
promulgated regulations that permitted aliens to file only “one motion
to reopen within 90 days.”59 The revised regulations, however,
retained the IJ and the BIA’s sua sponte authority to reopen
proceedings.60
III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION LAW AFTER THE IIRIRA
In 1996, Congress enacted the IIRIRA, which codified “some—but
not all—of the Attorney General’s 1996 regulations regarding motions
to reopen.”61 Included within the statute were the Attorney General’s
regulatory numerical and temporal limitations for motions to reopen
or reconsider.62 Congress, however, did not include the departure bar
or regulations that granted sua sponte authority to the IJ and BIA in the
statute.63
Instead, the IIRIRA repealed the originally codified
departure bar in such a manner that an alien’s departure from the
United States no longer foreclosed that alien’s legal ability to seek
judicial review of a BIA order.64
The Attorney General specifically addressed the IIRIRA’s repeal of
the INA’s codified departure bar by promulgating new regulations on
March 6, 1997, which included both a departure bar and sua sponte
authority for the BIA to consider motions to reopen.65 According to the
Attorney General, “‘[n]o provision of the [IIRIRA] supports reversing
the long established rule that a motion to reopen . . . cannot be made in
58 § 545(d)(1), 104 Stat. at 5066 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2006));
see also Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656.
59 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657 (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 13 (2008)).
60 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.2(a), 3.23(b)(1) (2000); see also Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657.
61 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657; Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-587–89
(1996).
62 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2006) (stating that “[a]n alien may file one motion to
reopen proceedings under this section,” which must generally be filed “within 90 days
of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal”). For the text of the
current departure bar see infra Part VII.
63 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657.
64 Id.
65 See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of
Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10.312,
10.330–31 (Mar. 6, 1997) (final rule codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a), (d) (1997) then
subsequently moved to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (2009)); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d),
1003.23(b)(1) (2011); Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657.
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immigration proceedings by or on behalf of a person after that
person’s departure from the United States.’”66 These regulations,
promulgated by the Attorney General, are still in effect today.
Congress, however, has not amended the statutory language in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(6)(A) or 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) to include these
regulations or any jurisdictional bar to considering motions to reopen
or reconsider by aliens after they have departed from the county.
VI. BIA’S REGULATORY DEPARTURE BAR JURISPRUDENCE
In order to understand the reasoning behind the BIA’s departure
bar holdings in subsequent circuit court of appeals opinions, this Part
will briefly highlight three major BIA cases analyzing post-departure
bars.
A.

In re G-y-B

In 1954, the Board in In re G-y-B upheld the first version of the
1952 regulatory post-departure bar.67 The IJ originally excluded the
petitioner under the INA on grounds that he was affiliated with the
Communist party of a foreign state.68 Thus, on August 14, 1953,
petitioner departed the country and subsequently filed a motion to
reopen and reconsider on November 24, 1953.69 Although the
petitioner included new facts to support his claim that he should not
have been excluded, the Board ruled that it was “without jurisdiction
to act on the motion.”70 The Board applied the post-departure bar
under 8 C.F.R. § 6.12,71 which in pertinent part stated,
Departure from the United States of a person who is the subject of
deportation proceedings subsequent to the taking of an appeal but
prior to a decision thereon shall constitute a withdrawal of the appeal
and the initial decision in the case shall be final to the same extent as
though no appeal had been taken.72
For this reason, the Board dismissed petitioner’s motions.73

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657 (quoting 62 Fed. Reg. at 10,312).
6 I. & N. Dec. 159, 160 (B.I.A. 1954); see also Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656.
In re G-y-B, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 159.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 159–60.
8 C.F.R. § 6.12 (1952).
In re G-y-B, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 160.
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B.

In re Armendarez-Mendez

The Board continued upholding its ruling in In re G-y-B
throughout the years. In 2008, the BIA once again upheld its
longstanding application of the regulatory departure bar in In re
Armendarez-Mendez.74 Government officials removed respondent from
the United States on December 11, 2000.75 Then, nearly five and onehalf years later, respondent filed a motion for the court to reopen his
proceedings sua sponte.76 Having found the departure bar in 8 C.F.R. §
1003.2(d) applicable, the Board denied his motion.77 Respondent
subsequently filed a petition of review to the Fifth Circuit.78 In light of
the holding in the Ninth Circuit’s case Lin v. Gonzales,79 the Fifth Circuit
remanded respondent’s matter to the BIA to consider the questions
raised in his case.80
On remand, in a lengthy opinion, the Board detailed the history
and analyzed the different interpretations of the regulatory departure
bar and the validity of the regulation as applied in different federal
circuit courts.81 The Board first reviewed the Ninth Circuit’s holding in
Lin and concluded that its reasoning was unpersuasive because
“[w]hen the departure bar rule is examined in context, we believe it
clearly applies to removed aliens.”82 The Board then detailed its
disagreement with the Fourth Circuit’s holding in William v. Gonzales.83
In the Board’s view, the Act, when taken as a whole, draws a distinction
between aliens who have departed after being ordered removed and
those who have remained in the United States.84 Ultimately, the Board
24 I. & N. Dec. 646, 660 (B.I.A. 2008).
Id. at 646, 647.
76 See id. at 646.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 473 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that so long as 8 C.F.R. §
1003.23(b)(1) is explicitly phrased in the present tense, an IJ has jurisdiction to
consider a motion to reopen filed by a removed alien).
80 In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 646.
81 Id. at 647–60.
82 Id. at 651.
83 Id. at 654–60; William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 330 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding
that the INA’s statutory language always invalidates regulatory departure bars); see
discussion of William infra Part V.A.
84 In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 655 (“[The William court] observed
that
[8 U.S.C. §] 240(c)(7) of the Act does not expressly distinguish between aliens who
have departed the United States after being ordered removed and those who have
remained.”). The Board also disagreed with the majority in William because it did not
find that the physical presence requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 240(c)(7)(C)(v)(IV)
implicitly invalidated the departure bar. Id. at 658; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(v)(IV)
74
75
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explained that it was bound by the Fourth Circuit’s precedent to apply
the William holding to BIA cases involving post-departure bar issues;
however, the Board explicitly noted that such rulings would be limited
exclusively to the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction.85 The Board further
explained, albeit in dicta,86 that “the departure bar regulation deprives
the BIA of jurisdiction to consider statutory motions to reopen after
the movant’s departure from the United States.”87
In other
jurisdictions, the BIA concluded that it will continue to uphold the
validity of the regulatory departure bars.88
C.

In re Bulnes-Nolasco

In 2009, the BIA restricted the scope of the departure-bar rule in
In re Bulnes-Nolasco with regard to a motion to reopen to rescind an
order.89 The court held the departure bar inapplicable to aliens who
have departed the country while under an outstanding order of
deportation or removal issued in absentia.90 Respondent, a native and
citizen of Honduras, entered the United States without inspection on
July 28, 1996.91 Then, in August 1996, the DHS served respondent with
an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing.92 Respondent,
however, did not appear for her deportation hearing two years later, at
which point the IJ ordered her deported in absentia.93 Nine years later,
on December 7, 2007, respondent filed a motion to reopen on the
ground that she did not receive proper notice of the deportation
hearing.94 Upholding the application of the departure bar, the IJ denied
respondent’s motion on January 17, 2008.95

(2006) (imposing a physical presence requirement in the United States for domestic
violence victims for filing motions to reopen or reconsider).
85 In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 660.
86 Petitioner Armendarez-Mendez violated the regulatory filing deadline by
submitting the motion at issue nearly fifteen months late. Id. at 647. Therefore,
reaching the issue of whether the departure bar was valid was not necessary to the
court’s conclusion. See id.
87 Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing In re Armendarez-Mendez,
24 I & N. Dec. at 653–60).
88 In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 660.
89 25 I. & N. Dec. 57, 60 (B.I.A. 2009).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 57.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 In re Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 58. Respondent then filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the IJ denied that motion as well. Id.
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The Board read 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(g) as presupposing the existence of
an outstanding order for deportation as the basis on which an alien’s
“self-deportation” may deprive the court of jurisdiction to consider the
alien’s motion to reopen or reconsider.96 Examining the specific
language used in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2),97 the Board
focused on the usage of the term “rescinded” and noted that the term
“rescind” means “to annul ab initio”98 when dealing with an in absentia
deportation order.99 The Board then ruled that “[a]n in absentia
deportation order issued in proceedings of which the respondent had
no notice is voidable from its inception and becomes a legal nullity
upon its rescission, with the result that the respondent reverts to the
same immigration status that he . . . possessed prior to entry of the
order.”100 Ultimately, the Board concluded, as did the Eleventh Circuit
in Contreras-Rodriguez v. United States Attorney General,101 “that an in
absentia deportation order does not so qualify if it was issued in a
proceeding of which the alien did not properly receive notice.”102
The above-referenced cases illustrate the lack of predictability
and uniformity in the BIA’s decisions.103 Despite having a long history
of upholding the regulatory departure bars, the BIA has recently begun
modifying its jurisprudence in this area of the law. As noted, the BIA
96
97

part:

Id. at 59.
Regarding exceptions to filing deadlines, the regulation provides in relevant

(A) An order entered in absentia in deportation proceedings may be
rescinded only upon a motion to reopen filed:
....
(2) At any time if the alien demonstrates that he or she did not receive
notice or if the alien demonstrates that he or she was in federal or state
custody and the failure to appear was through no fault of the alien.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2) (2011).
98 See In re M-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 349, 353 (B.I.A. 1998) (citing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1306 (6th ed. 1990) (“‘[R]escission’ means to annul ab initio.”)). “Ab initio”
is a Latin term meaning “[f]rom the beginning.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 4 (7th ed.
1999).
99 In re Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 59.
100 Id.
101 462 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2006). See In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec.
646, 654 n.6 (B.I.A. 2008) (reserving decision on this issue).
102 In re Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 59. Finally, the Board remanded the
matter to the IJ to allow him to decide whether the respondent’s in absentia
deportation order was subject to rescission for lack of proper notice. Id. at 60.
103 See David Isaacson, Filing and Adjudication of Motions to Reopen and Reconsider
After Departure From the United States, CYRUS D. MEHTA & ASSOCS., PLLC IMMIGRATION &
NATIONALITY
LAW
(Sept.
13,
2010),
http://www.cyrusmehta.com/News.aspx?SubIdx=ocyrus201091310474&Month=&Fr
om=Menu&Page=19&Year=All (“Recent caselaw . . . indicates that this rule is not as
uniform as many had previously supposed.”).
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deviated slightly from its longstanding practice of upholding the
regulatory departure bar in In re Bulnes-Nolasco, which may suggest
that the BIA is willing to assess the validity of departure bars
separately in different contexts.104
V.
A.

DEPARTURE BAR JURISPRUDENCE IN FEDERAL COURTS

The Fourth Circuit’s William v. Gonzales

Tunbosun Olawale William (“William”), a native and citizen of
Nigeria, became a legal permanent resident of the United States in
1996.105 One year later, a Maryland court sentenced William to prison
and probation after he pled guilty to receipt of a stolen credit card in
violation of Maryland law.106
Then, in November 1997, “the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (‘INS’) charged William with
being removable as an aggravated felon for committing an offense
involving fraud or deceit” and subsequently “charged William with
being removable as having committed a crime of moral turpitude.”107
Ultimately, an IJ found William removable based on his conviction of a
crime of moral turpitude and ineligible for relief.108 The BIA affirmed
the IJ’s decision and William did not seek further review in the Fourth
Circuit.109 Government officials then removed William from the United
States in July 2005.110
Shortly after removal, William filed a petition for a writ of coram
nobis111 in state court seeking to vacate his Maryland conviction.112 In
October 2005, the state court granted William’s writ and vacated his
conviction.113 Then, in December 2005, “William filed a motion to
reopen immigration proceedings before the BIA” based on the
exceptional circumstances of his case.114 The BIA denied his motion by
In re Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 60; see infra Part IV.C.
William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 2007).
106 Id. The court sentenced William “to eighteen months imprisonment, with nine
months suspended and three years probation.” Id.
107 Id.; see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006).
108 William, 499 F.3d at 331.
109 Id. William did, however, file a motion to reconsider with the BIA whereby he
argued “that he had received limited post-conviction relief in the form of a reduction of
sentence.” Id. The BIA denied this motion and, once again, William did not pursue
further review in the Fourth Circuit. Id.
110 Id.
111 See United States v. Denedo, 129 S. Ct. 2213, 2220 (2009) (“The writ of coram
nobis is an ancient common-law remedy designed to correct errors of fact.”).
112 William, 499 F.3d at 331.
113 Id.
114 Id.
104
105
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holding that the departure bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) stripped the
court of jurisdiction to consider William’s motion because he had
already been removed from the country.115 At this point, William
petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review of the BIA’s application of the
departure bar.116 William primarily argued that “the post-departure
bar on motions to reopen[] is invalid because it conflicts with clear
statutory language.”117 The government, however, argued that the
statute is “silent with respect to post-departure motions to reopen in
that it does not specifically address them,” and therefore the Attorney
General’s regulations appropriately filled the gap.118
Judge Shedd, writing for the majority, used the Chevron119 analysis
to determine the validity of the Agency’s regulation.120 Beginning with
the statutory provision, the court noted that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)
provides that “‘[a]n alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings
under this section.’”121 Given its precise language, which explicitly
provides for a temporal limitation but also specifically removes the
prior codified geographical limitation, the court found that “§
1229a(c)(7)(A) unambiguously provides an alien with the right to file
one motion to reopen, regardless of whether he is within or without
the country.”122 Thus, the Fourth Circuit foreclosed the government’s
argument that the statute “is silent with respect to post-departure
motions to reopen.”123
Additionally, the court found that the “clarity and breadth of the
statutory language likewise overc[a]me the Government’s argument
that . . . Congress codified the right to file a motion to reopen while
leaving the regulatory post-departure bar in place by not expressly
Id.
Id.
117 Id. at 331. William argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) grants the right to
reopen without regard to an alien’s physical presence in the country. See id. at 332.
This, he argued, conflicted with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), which limits the right based on the
alien’s physical presence in the country. See id. at 331–32.
118 William, 499 F.3d at 332.
119 Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under the
Chevron doctrine, a court must first consider “whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842. If so, the inquiry ends because both the court
and the agency “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”
Id. at 842–43. On the other hand, if Congress has not addressed the question at issue,
the court must determine “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.” Id. at 843.
120 William, 499 F.3d at 331.
121 Id. at 332 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)(2006)). For the text of the current
departure bar see infra Part VII.
122 William, 499 F.3d at 332.
123 Id.
115
116
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repealing it.”124 According to the court, Congress clearly addressed and
“at least implicitly repealed” the departure bar when it decided to
grant “an alien” the right to move to reopen without further specifying
a physical presence requirement.125 Moreover, the court noted that the
government’s argument also lacked contextual support because “one of
IIRIRA’s aims is to expedite the removal of aliens from the country
while permitting them to continue to seek review of their removal
orders from abroad.”126
The majority found that the overall structure of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a
reinforced its interpretation of § 1229a(c)(7)(A) in two ways.127 First,
Congress’s specific limitations on the right to file a motion to reopen
supports the conclusion that § 1229a(c)(7)(A) cannot be read to
exclude aliens who have departed the country.128 Second, for motions
to reopen for victims of domestic violence under §
1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV),129 Congress expressly included a physical
presence requirement.130 Thus, the court drew a negative inference
that, by not requiring physical presence in the statutory language of §
1229a(c)(7)(A), Congress did not intend to limit such motions to
reopen to aliens who have not departed the country.131 Further, the
court also noted that if Congress had intended the departure bar to
apply to all motions, the express language requiring physical presence
for victims of domestic violence would be superfluous.132
Id. at n.2.
Id.
126 Id. at n.3.
127 Id. at 333.
128 William, 499 F.3d at 333; see United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000)
(“When Congress provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow that courts have
authority to create others. The proper inference . . . is that Congress considered the
issue of exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the ones set forth.”).
129 The Act states in pertinent part:
(iv) Special rule for battered spouses, children, and parents. Any
limitation under this section on the deadlines for filing such motions
shall not apply.
....
(IV) if the alien is physically present in the United States at the time of
filing the motion.
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV) (2006).
130 See William, 499 F.3d at 333.
131 Id.; see Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 528 (2003) (“[Where] Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section
of the same Act . . . it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
132 See William, 499 F.3d at 333; see, e.g., TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31
(2001) (“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon
124
125
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The majority concluded that congressional intent was
unequivocal: “§ 1229a(c)(7)(A) clearly and unambiguously grants an
alien the right to file one motion to reopen, regardless of whether he is
present in the United States when the motion is filed.”133 Therefore, 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) is in direct conflict with the clear language of the
statute; the INA thereby removes any authority from the regulation
and renders it invalid.134
Chief Judge Williams dissented.135 The Chief Judge’s primary
disagreements with the majority’s analysis were that Congress’s
statutory language did not repeal the regulatory departure bar and
that the majority never engaged in the second step of the Chevron
analysis.136 Unlike the majority, the dissent could not get a “‘clear
sense of congressional intent’ to repeal the departure bar simply
because the numerical limitation on motions to reopen now occupies a
place in the United States Code where previously it only existed in the
Federal Register.”137 Chief Judge Williams further noted that, when
viewed in its entirety, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) makes clear that the
statute is nothing more than a numerical limitation on an alien’s ability
to file a motion to reopen immigration proceedings.138 Moreover, the
dissent pointed out that Congress did not add the domestic violence
exception’s physical presence requirement to § 1229a until 2000—
nearly a decade after IIRIRA’s enactment.139

the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word
shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”).
133 William, 499 F.3d at 333; see In re Coleman, 426 F.3d 719, 725 (4th Cir. 2005)
(“If the language is plain and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, we need
not inquire further.”).
134 William, 499 F.3d at 334; see Allen v. United States, 173 F.3d 533, 536 (4th Cir.
1999) (“[W]e must overturn a regulation that clearly conflicts with the plain text of the
statute.”).
135 William, 499 F.3d at 334 (Williams, C.J., dissenting).
136 See id.
137 Id. at 335 (quoting Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600
(2004)).
138 See id. at 336; see United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984) (“We do not .
. . construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole.”).
139 William, 499 F.3d at 337 (Williams, C.J., dissenting); see Victims of Trafficking
and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464. According to
Chief Judge Williams, this Act sought to “snuff out sex slave trade and domestic
violence,” which is “connected neither in time nor purpose” to the IIRIRA amendments
regarding motions to reopen. William, 499 F.3d at 337 (Williams, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Judge Williams countered the “negative inference” argument by stating that
“Congress is presumed to have known about and approved of the departure bar when
it amended the INA without explicitly repealing it.” Id. at 338–41 (Williams, C.J.,
dissenting).
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Under Chief Judge Williams’s own analysis of Chevron’s first step,
he concluded that the statute is silent, and the agency is empowered by
statute to issue regulations to dispel the silence.140 The Judge then
proceeded to Chevron’s second step.141 Chief Judge Williams concluded
that the Attorney General’s reasoning that the goal of achieving finality
in immigration matters outweighs the burdens associated with
adjudicating motions to reopen filed on behalf of departed or removed
aliens is reasonable enough to defer to the Attorney General and thus
uphold the regulation.142
B.

The Tenth Circuit’s Mendiola v. Holder

Prior to the release of the Mendiola decision, but after briefing, the
Tenth Circuit decided Rosillo-Puga v. Holder. Finding the case
analogous to Mendiola’s, the Mendiola court relied heavily on the
precedential effect of Rosillo-Puga.143
1.

Rosillo-Puga v. Holder

In 2003, an IJ ordered Rosillo-Puga removed to Mexico.144 Three
years later he filed a motion to reopen his proceedings with the IJ on
the ground that the court could exercise sua sponte jurisdiction under
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)145 to consider his motion.146 The IJ denied
Rosillo-Puga’s motion, and the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, finding
that § 1003.23(b)(1) deprived the IJ of jurisdiction to hear RosilloPuga’s motion to reopen proceedings because he had already departed
the country.147
Rosillo-Puga relied upon William v. Gonzales in making his
argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) permits “an alien” to file one
See William, 499 F.3d at 342 (Williams, C.J., dissenting).
Chevron’s second step requires the court to determine whether the regulation is
“reasonable in light of the legislature’s revealed design” in order to uphold the agency’s
interpretation. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
142 See id. at 345; Nat’l Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 146 (1920)
(explaining that deference to an agency’s construction of a statute is “especially
[appropriate] where such construction has been long continued”); William, 499 F.3d. at
345 (Williams, C.J., dissenting).
143 See Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1304–05 (10th Cir. 2009).
144 Id. at 1306 (citation omitted). This Part of the Comment focuses mainly on the
Mendiola court’s iteration of the facts and holding of Rosillo-Puga. Rosillo-Puga, 580
F.3d 1147. It is the author’s position that the precedential effect of Rosillo-Puga is
better understood through the Mendiola court’s iteration of Rosillo-Puga’s facts and
holding.
145 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2011) (“An Immigration Judge may upon his or her
own motion at any time . . . reopen or reconsider any case . . . .”); see infra Part VII.
146 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1306–07.
147 Id. at 1307.
140
141
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motion to reopen regardless of whether that alien is inside or outside
the United States.148 The Rosillo-Puga court, however, disagreed with
the majority’s opinion in William and instead reached the same
conclusion that was articulated in Chief Judge Williams’s dissent.149 As
the court did in William, the Rosillo-Puga court applied the two-step
Chevron test to review the Agency’s construction of the statute at
issue.150 First, the court analyzed Congress’s statutory language and
found that it was “‘simply silent on the issue of whether it meant to
repeal the post-departure bars contained in the Attorney General’s
regulations.’”151 The court then inquired into “whether the agency’s
interpretation is ‘based on a permissible construction of the
statute.’”152 Finding it “inconceivable” for Congress to have repealed
the regulatory post-departure bar without stating anything about its
forty-year history in practice, the court upheld the post-departure bar
as a valid regulation under the ‘“Attorney General’s Congressionallydelegated rulemaking authority, and [therefore ruled that the bar]
does not contravene 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) or (7)(C).”‘153
The Rosillo-Puga court ultimately upheld the BIA’s holdings that it
lacked jurisdiction to hear Rosillo-Puga’s motion to reopen under 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) and that the BIA and IJ lacked sua sponte jurisdiction
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)154 to consider the motion to reopen.155 The
ruling, however, was not unanimous; Judge Lucero filed a lone
dissent.156
148 See id.; see also William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 2007). For a
discussion of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2006) see infra Part VII.
149 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1307.
150 Id. at 1307–08; see William, 499 F.3d at 331–32.
151 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1307–08 (quoting Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147,
1157 (10th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
152 Id. at 1308 (quoting Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1157).
153 See id. (quoting Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1156) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
154 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2011) (“The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider
on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.”); see 8 C.F.R. §
1003.23(b)(1) (2011) (“An [IJ] may upon his or her own motion at any time . . . reopen
or reconsider any case in which he or she has made a decision . . . .”).
155 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1308; see also Navarro-Miranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672,
675–76 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding the interpretation by the BIA that the departure bar
removes its jurisdiction, including its sua sponte authority, to reopen the removal
proceedings of a deported alien to be reasonable and upholding the same).
156 See Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1161–1171 (Lucero, J., dissenting); see also
Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1308 n.5;. For purposes of developing Judge Lucero’s arguments
in his dissenting opinion in greater detail from that which is found in the Mendiola
opinion, this Comment will provide some additional information by analyzing text
taken directly from Judge Lucero’s dissenting opinion in Rosillo-Puga.
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Judge Lucero reasoned that a plain reading of 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(c)(6)(A) and (7)(A) “unambiguously guarantee[s] every alien
the right to file . . . one motion to reopen removal proceedings,
regardless of whether the alien has departed from the United
States.”157 According to the dissent, Congress’s use of inclusive
language in the terms “the alien” and “an alien” indicated Congress’s
intent not to exclude a subclass of aliens—those who have departed
and are thus outside the INA’s scope.158 Judge Lucero also found, as did
the majority in William, that the textual contrast between the domestic
violence section of the statute, which explicitly imposes a physical
presence requirement, and other sections of the statute that do not,
illustrates Congress’s intent not to place geographical limitations on all
motions to reopen or reconsider.159 Such a reading, the dissent noted,
would render the physical presence requirement under the domestic
violence section “mere surplusage.”160
2.

Mendiola v. Holder

Eddie Mendiola, a native and citizen of Peru, became a lawful
permanent resident of the United States in April 1989.161 In July 1996
and August 2000, a California state court convicted Mendiola of
possession of steroids.162 Subsequently, an Idaho state court convicted
Mendiola of being an accessory to a felony in September 2003.163
Thereafter, DHS officials detained and transported Mendiola to an
immigration detention facility in Colorado.164
The DHS then

157 Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1162 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
Under a different
approach, Judge Lucero noted that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dada v.
Mukasey “‘supports the conclusion that the post-departure bar is inconsistent with’ the
statute because it ‘held all aliens have a statutory right to file one motion to reopen’
pursuant to § 1229a(c)(7).” Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1168 (Lucero, J., dissenting); see
Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 22 (2008) (stating that a “more expeditious solution” to
the problem would be to permit aliens to file motions to reopen after they have left the
country) (decided on other grounds).
158 Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1164 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 1165; see also William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 2007).
160 Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1165 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (quoting William, 499 F.3d
at 333).
161 Mendiola v. Gonzales, 189 F. App’x 810, 812 (10th Cir. 2006).
162 Id.; see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11377(a) (West 2010). On July 30, 1996, a
California state court convicted Mendiola of misdemeanor possession in violation of a
state law. Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 812. Then, on August 7, 2000, the court convicted
him of felony possession. Id.
163 Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 812.
164 Id.
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commenced removal proceedings against Mendiola on grounds that he
was an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.165
Mendiola moved for a change of venue from the Tenth Circuit to
the Ninth Circuit, arguing that his underlying conviction occurred in
California and thus his case should fall within the Ninth Circuit’s
jurisdiction.166 The IJ denied a change of venue, applied Tenth Circuit
law, found that Mendiola was removable based upon his aggravated
felony conviction, and ordered him removed to Peru.167 The BIA
affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Mendiola’s appeal.168 The BIA
noted that the IJ properly applied Tenth Circuit law because “there
[wa]s no reason to believe that the Tenth Circuit would apply Ninth
Circuit law to determine [Mendiola’s] removability simply because
[his] criminal conviction occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Ninth Circuit.”169
Mendiola then petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review.170 While
his petition was pending, government officials removed Mendiola to
Peru in March 2005.171 The court then denied Mendiola’s petition.172
Within two years, Mendiola returned to the United States illegally.173
In 2007, Mendiola filed his first motion to reopen with the BIA while he
was in federal custody for his illegal return.174 The BIA denied his
motion on two grounds: (1) 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) stripped the BIA of
jurisdiction to consider the motion, and (2) Mendiola’s motion was
untimely because it was filed nearly three years after the expiration of
the ninety-day limit imposed by § 1003.2(c)(2).175 Mendiola filed
another petition in 2007.176 The BIA similarly denied this petition.177
165 Id.; see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006) (defining aggravated felony to include
a “drug-trafficking crime”), § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (pertaining to removability).
166 See Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 812.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.(citing United States v. Castro-Rocha, 323 F.3d 846 (10th Cir. 2003) (applying
Tenth Circuit law when deciding if conviction in a state outside Tenth Circuit’s
jurisdiction constituted aggravated felony); see also Tapia-Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216
(10th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998 (10th Cir. 1996)
(same)).
170 Id. at 811.
171 Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1305 (10th Cir. 2009).
172 Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 815.
173 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305. Shortly after Mendiola illegally returned to the
United States, federal agents detained him on a charge of reentry after removal for an
aggravated felony. Id. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006).
174 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305.
175 Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2011) (“[A] party may file only one motion to
reopen . . . proceedings (whether before the Board or the Immigration Judge) and that
motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final
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In 2008, Mendiola obtained new counsel and filed a second
motion to reopen his proceedings on grounds that his former
attorney’s ineffectiveness and the California court’s reduction of his
second conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor in 2007 rendered it
appropriate.178 The BIA denied Mendiola’s second motion to reopen,
holding again that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter under 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) and that it also lacked authority to reopen the
matter sua sponte under § 1003.2(a).179 In addition, the BIA found that
Mendiola’s motion was deniable due to its untimeliness and to the
numerical limitation placed on motions to reopen under §
1003.2(c)(2).180 Undeterred, Mendiola once again filed a petition for
review with the Tenth Circuit, which the court ultimately granted.181
Circuit Judge Baldock, writing for the majority, began the court’s
analysis with a look at the history of the post-departure bar in the
United States and the IIRIRA’s enactment in 1996.182 The court noted
that “for fifty years the BIA has consistently followed this
‘jurisdictional principle,’ holding ‘that reopening is unavailable to any
alien who departs the United States after being ordered removed.’”183
After discussing the pertinent facts and holding of Rosillo-Puga, the
court focused its attention on Mendiola’s primary arguments.
Mendiola argued that the BIA erred when it held that 8 C.F.R. §
1003.2(d) deprived it of jurisdiction to hear his motion to reopen.184
He also argued that “Rosillo-Puga did not extend the post-departure
bar’s application to motions to reopen filed by aliens pursuant to 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) where the motion alleges ineffective assistance of
counsel rising to the level of a due process violation.”185
The court relied on Rosillo-Puga’s precedential effect to counter
both arguments.186 First, the court, in accordance with stare decisis
administrative decision was rendered . . .”). Mendiola’s final administrative order of
removal was issued in 2004. Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305.
176 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305.
177 Id. Mendiola failed to argue in his briefs that § 1003.2(d) did not apply to his
case. Mendiola v. Mukasey, 280 F. App’x 719, 722 (10th Cir. 2008).
178 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305.
179 Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2011) (“The Board may at any time reopen or
reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.”).
180 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305–06; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2011); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2006) (containing similar language involving a ninety-day limit).
181 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1306.
182 Id.
183 Id. (quoting In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 646, 648 (B.I.A. 2008)).
184 Id. at 1304.
185 Id. at 1309; see § 1003.2(c)(2) (2011).
186 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1310.
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principles, upheld the Rosillo-Puga court’s conclusion that § 1003.2(d)
was valid.187 Second, finding that the language of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)
“mirrors” the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), which the Rosillo-Puga
court addressed, the Mendiola court applied the same analysis to the
present matter.188
The court then iterated the Rosillo-Puga court’s conclusion that
“Congress’s provision for one motion to reopen within 90 days of
removal in those statutory subsections does not alter the valid
continued operation of the regulatory post-departure bar to motions to
reopen.”189 The court then noted that the departure bar divested the
BIA and IJ of jurisdiction in Rosillo-Puga under a similar regulatory
departure bar and also specified that the court is “bound by the
precedent.”190 Thus, the court held that the departure bar applied to
Mendiola.191
C.

Additional Applications of the Departure Bar in the Federal
Circuits

As the case summaries above have shown, case law “indicates
[that] this rule is not as uniform as many had previously supposed.” 192
“[A] substantial number of Court of Appeals and BIA cases have opened
up the possibility that certain aliens may be able to file or pursue
motions to reopen and reconsider even after departing from the United
States.”193 To illustrate the disparities in departure bar jurisprudence
in different areas of the country, this Comment will now consider a
sample of pertinent circuit cases.
1.

The First Circuit Upholds Regulatory Departure Bar’s
Validity

In Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, the First Circuit held that the departure
bar in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) was a valid jurisdictional limitation on
an IJ’s authority to consider a departed alien’s motion to reopen or
reconsider proceedings.194 The First Circuit’s jurisdiction includes
Id.; see Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147, 1156 (2009).
Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1309–10.
189 Id. (citing Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1156).
190 Id. at 1310.
191 Id.
192 Isaacson, supra note 103.
193 Id.
194 489 F.3d 438, 443 (1st Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d
650, 654 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the Pena court rejected “the argument that the
departure bar was impliedly repealed by the [IIRIRA]”); William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d
329, 345 n.6 (4th Cir. 2007) (Williams, C.J., dissenting).
187
188
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Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico, and Rhode
Island.195 Therefore, a departed alien whose removal proceedings have
taken place or are taking place within the First Circuit’s jurisdiction
will be barred from filing a motion to reopen the proceedings.
2.

The Second Circuit Holds that the BIA Cannot Constrict
Its Congressionally-Given Jurisdiction

In Zhang v. Holder, the Second Circuit upheld as reasonable the
BIA’s decision to bar the petitioner’s motion to reopen removal
proceedings seeking the court’s sua sponte authority under 8 C.F.R. §
1003.2(a) because of the particular historical evolution of the
regulation and because the alien had departed the country.196 More
specifically, the court upheld as “not plainly erroneous” the BIA’s
interpretation that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) deprives the Board of
jurisdiction to hear petitioner’s motion to reopen sua sponte.197 In
2011, however, the Second Circuit revisited the departure bar issue
and reached a different result in Luna v. Holder.198 While following an
approach similar to the Sixth199 and Seventh Circuits’,200 the court in
Luna held that the “BIA may not contract the jurisdiction that Congress
gave it by applying the departure bar regulation [under] 8 C.F.R. §
1003.2(d) . . . to statutory motions to reopen.”201 According to the
court, Congress did not make jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(c)(7) dependent upon whether an alien is present within the
United States.202 Rather, the IIRIRA repealed the statutory bar to
departed aliens that had already been in place.203 Ultimately, the court
held that “the BIA must exercise its full jurisdiction to adjudicate a
statutory motion to reopen by an alien who is removed or otherwise
departs the United States before or after filing the motion.”204 Thus, a
departed alien who was subject to or is subject to removal proceedings

195 See
Court
Locator,
UNITED
STATES
COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/court_locator.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2012).
196 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 661.
197 Id. at 652.
198 637 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2011).
199 See discussion infra Part V.C.6.
200 See discussion infra Part V.C.7.
201 Luna, 637 F.3d at 100.
202 Id. at 101.
203 Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (repealed 1996).
204 Luna, 637 F.3d at 102. The court declined, however, to determine the validity of
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) in every possible context. Id. Thus, it is not clear how the court
will rule on an issue regarding the regulatory sua sponte motion to reopen.

124

in Connecticut, New York, or Vermont is not barred from filing a
statutory motion to reopen.205
3.

The Third Circuit Holds Post-Departure Bar Conflicts
with Clear Congressional Intent

In an unpublished opinion in 2009, the Third Circuit upheld the
validity of the departure bar contained in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d),
pertaining to motions to reopen or reconsider before the BIA.206 In
2010, the Third Circuit held the BIA’s interpretation of the regulatory
departure bar in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e)207 to be incorrect because the
Board equated the word “departure” with “deportation” and/or
“remov[al].”208 In its decision, the court noted that although an alien
who voluntarily departs during deportation proceedings may be
deemed to have waived his or her right to appeal, “it is less equitable to
so deem an alien who was involuntarily removed . . . .”209
More recently, the Third Circuit unequivocally held that “the postdeparture bar regulation [under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d)] conflicts with
Congress’[s] clear intent for several reasons.”210 Those reasons
included, among others, that the “plain text of the statute provides each
‘alien’ with the right to file one motion to reopen”; that Congress
incorporated geographical limitations in a subsequent addition to the
IIRIRA but did not add a geographical limitation to the overall statute
generally; and that “Congress specifically withdrew the statutory postdeparture bar to judicial review in conformity with IIRIRA’s purpose of
speeding departure, but improving accuracy.”211 The Third Circuit’s
jurisdiction includes Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.212
Therefore, aliens whose judicial proceedings took place in these states

205 The Second Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states. See Court Locator,
supra note 195.
206 Tahiraj-Dauti v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 323 F. App’x 138, 139 (3d Cir. 2009); see infra
text accompanying note 265.
207 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e) (2011) (“Departure from the United States of a person who
is the subject of deportation proceedings, prior to the taking of an appeal from a
decision in his or her case, shall constitute a waiver of his or her right to appeal.”).
208 Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 394 F. App’x 941, 944–55 (3d Cir. 2010).
209 Id. at 945 (emphasis added); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e) (2011) (pertaining to
waivers of appeal).
210 Espinal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 224 (3d Cir. 2011). Although this case
dealt specifically with the motion-to-reconsider portion of the regulation, the court
noted that the analysis for the motion to reopen is the same and thus if one portion is
invalid, the other is as well. Id. at 217 n.3.
211 Id. at 224.
212 See Court Locator, supra note 195.
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will not be jurisdictionally barred solely because they have filed
motions to reopen after departing the United States.
4.

The Fourth Circuit Holds that Regulatory Departure Bars
Are Always Invalid

As noted in greater detail above,213 the Fourth Circuit holds that
the departure bar contained in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) clearly conflicts
with the statutory language in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) and therefore
is rendered invalid.214 Thus, an alien who faces removal proceedings in
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, or West Virginia is
not jurisdictionally barred from filing a motion to reopen or reconsider
solely because the alien has departed the country.215
5.

The Fifth Circuit Upholds Regulatory Departure Bar’s
Validity

In 2003, the Fifth Circuit in Ovalles v. Holder ruled that the BIA’s
decision—that the departure bar in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) deprived the
BIA of the jurisdiction to sua sponte consider a motion to reopen filed
by an alien who has departed the country following termination of
removal proceedings—was proper.216 More recently, the court directly
ruled on the regulatory departure bar’s validity in Toora v. Holder.217
In Toora, the court held that the departure bar contained in 8 C.F.R. §
1003.23(b)(1) “applied to an alien who departed the U.S. after
receiving notice of his deportation proceeding, but before the
proceeding was completed and the [IJ] entered a deportation order.”218
Thus, individuals whose removal proceedings have already been
terminated and individuals who are presently subject to removal
proceedings in Louisiana, Mississippi, or Texas, and have departed the
See supra Part V.A.
William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 2007).
215 The Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states. See Court Locator, supra
note 195.
216 577 F.3d 288, 299–300 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding no need to squarely address the
validity of § 1003.2(d) because the motion to reopen was untimely); see NavarroMiranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(d)—
the predecessor to § 1003.2(d)—as a valid restriction on the BIA’s jurisdiction to hear
an alien’s motion to reopen once that alien has departed the United States). See
generally Emma Rebhorn, Note, Ovalles v. Holder: Better Late than . . . on Time? The
Fifth Circuit Avoids Ruling on the Validity of the Postdeparture Bar, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1347
(discussing how the Fifth Circuit avoided directly addressing the validity of the
departure bar at issue).
217 603 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2010).
218 Toora v. Holder, No. 09-60073, FINDLAW (Apr. 9, 2010, 12:03 PM),
http://blogs.findlaw.com/fifth_circuit/2010/
04/toora-v-holder-no-09-60073.html (discussing Toora, 603 F.3d at 288).
213
214
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United States either after completion of their removal proceedings or
prior to an official removal order, will be barred from moving to
reopen or reconsider their proceedings.219
6.

The Sixth Circuit Holds that the BIA Cannot Constrict Its
Jurisdiction to Hear Statutorily Created Motions to
Reopen

In 2007, the Sixth Circuit simply noted in a footnote in Ablahad v.
Gonzales that petitioner’s “motions to reopen were also barred by 8
C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d) and 1003.23(b)(1).”220 Two years later, however,
the court addressed the particular matter at issue in Madrigal v. Holder
with finality when it held that the departure bar rule under 8 C.F.R. §
1003.4221 does not apply to aliens who have been involuntarily
removed from the United States.222 In 2011, the Sixth Circuit resolved
all of the outstanding issues concerning the departure bar’s application
in Pruidze v. Holder, where the court held that the BIA cannot curtail its
own jurisdiction to entertain a departed alien’s motion to reopen.223
First, the court explicitly stated that “no statute gives the [BIA]
purchase for disclaiming jurisdiction to entertain a motion to reopen
filed by aliens who have left the country.”224 Second, the court
explained that a line of recent Supreme Court decisions makes clear
that the BIA’s authority is to interpret the regulation as a mandatory
legal rule and not as jurisdictional.225 Absent a statute providing the
BIA with such authority, “the agency may not disclaim jurisdiction to
handle a motion to reopen that Congress empowered it to resolve.”226
Thus, the BIA erred when it held that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) deprived it of
jurisdiction to entertain Pruidze’s motion.227 It follows that an alien
219 The Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states. See Court Locator, supra
note 195.
220 217 F. App’x 470, 475 n.6 (6th Cir. 2007).
221 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4 (2011) (pertaining to withdrawal of appeal).
222 572 F.3d 239, 243–45 (6th Cir. 2009); see Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d
591, 594 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the Sixth Circuit is one of two circuits that hold
departure bars inapplicable to involuntarily removed aliens). Involuntary removal
entails a government-induced removal. See Coyt v. Holder, 595 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir.
2010) (“[T]he physical removal of a petitioner by the United States does not preclude
the petitioner from pursuing a motion to reopen.”).
223 632 F.3d 234, 237–38 (6th Cir. 2011).
224 Id. at 237.
225 Id. at 238 (citing Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010); Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 130 S. Ct. 584 (2009); Bowles v. Russell, 551
U.S. 205 (2007); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540
U.S. 443 (2004); Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)).
226 Id. at 239.
227 Id. at 241.
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whose removal proceedings took place in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, or
Tennessee and has since departed the country voluntarily or
involuntarily may file a motion to reopen his or her proceedings.228
7.

The Seventh Circuit Holds that the BIA Cannot Constrict
Its Jurisdiction

The Seventh Circuit’s approach is similar to the Sixth Circuit’s. In
Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit struck down the
departure bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) as invalid because an agency
is not entitled to “contract its own jurisdiction by regulations or by
decisions in litigated proceedings.”229 Thus, “until the BIA rethinks the
theoretical basis for the departure bar . . . motions to reopen . . . will
survive an alien’s departure in the Seventh Circuit as well.”230 It
follows that aliens who are or were subjected to removal proceedings
in Illinois, Indiana, or Wisconsin, have since departed the country, and
wish to move to reopen their removal proceedings are not
jurisdictionally barred simply due to the regulatory departure bar’s
physical presence requirement.231
9.

The Ninth Circuit Holds the Regulatory Departure Bar
Inapplicable to Involuntarily Removed Aliens

In 2007, the Lin v. Gonzales232 court relied “on the rule of lenity to
hold that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) does not deprive an IJ of jurisdiction
to consider a motion to reopen filed by a removed alien” so long as the
regulation is explicitly phrased in the present tense.233 Subsequently,
the Ninth Circuit held in Coyt v. Holder that the regulatory departure
bar rule is not applicable to aliens who were involuntarily removed
from the United States.234 More recently, in Reyes-Torres v. Holder, the
228 The Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states. See Court Locator, supra
note 195.
229 612 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2010) (“We think that Union Pacific is dispositive in
favor of the holding in William—though on a rationale distinct from the [F]ourth
[C]ircuit’s.”); Union Pac. R.R., 130 S. Ct. 584; see also ROSENBLOOM ET AL., supra note 3, at
6–7 (noting that the court in Marin-Rodriguez held that the regulations are not
jurisdictional, and thus, the BIA cannot decline a motion to reopen on that ground).
230 See Isaacson, supra note 103.
231 The Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states. See Court Locator,
supra note 195.
232 Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2007).
233 Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 659 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Lin, 473 F.3d at 982).
234 593 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) “cannot
apply to cause the withdrawal of an administrative petition filed by a petitioner who
has been involuntarily removed . . . .”); see Marin-Rodriguez, 612 F.3d at 594 (noting
that the Sixth Circuit is one of two circuits that hold departure bars inapplicable to
involuntarily removed aliens). See generally Susan Kilgore, Developments in the Judicial
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court upheld its ruling in Coyt and reiterated that Congress’s intent in
enacting IIRIRA is clear: “‘Congress anticipated that petitioners would
be able to pursue relief after departing from the United States.’”235 In
particular, the court held that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) did not deprive the
BIA of jurisdiction to entertain Reyes-Torres’s motion to reopen his
case after being removed from the United States.236 Thus, the
departure bar’s physical presence requirement is clearly inapplicable
in cases where removal proceedings have been completed and the
alien has been removed. The Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction includes
Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon,
and Washington.237
10. The Tenth Circuit Holds that Regulatory Departure Bars
Are Always Valid
The Tenth Circuit’s approach to departure-bar case law is in
direct contrast to the Fourth Circuit’s. In Mendiola v. Holder, the Tenth
Circuit held that the departure bar in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) does not
conflict with the statutory language of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) and
therefore is a valid regulation applicable to departed aliens.238 The
court recently upheld the departure bar’s validity once again in
Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder.239 In Contreras-Bocanegra, the court
held that the departure bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) divested the BIA
of jurisdiction to hear petitioner’s motion to reopen despite the
timeliness of said motion because the motion was filed after petitioner
departed the country.240 Therefore, an alien who faces removal
proceedings in Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, or
Wyoming is jurisdictionally barred from filing a motion to reopen or
reconsider after departing from the United States.241

Branch: Ninth Circuit Issues Decision in Coyt v. Holder, Invalidating Departure Bar on
Motions to Reopen and Creating Circuit Split, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 383 (2010).
235 645 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Coyt, 593 F.3d at 906) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
236 Id. at 1077.
237 See Court Locator, supra note 195.
238 585 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir. 2009).
239 629 F.3d 1170, 1172 (10th Cir. 2010).
240 Id. at 1171–72.
241 See Court Locator, supra note 195.
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11. The Eleventh Circuit Upholds the Regulatory Departure
Bar as Valid
Sankar v. United States Attorney General is an unpublished opinion
addressing the applicability of the regulatory departure bar.242
Ultimately, the court in Sankar specifically upheld the departure bar in
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) as applied to motions to reopen or reconsider
before an IJ.243 If the court’s analysis does not change, aliens who were
or are subject to removal proceedings in Alabama, Florida, or Georgia,
and have since departed will not be permitted to file motions to reopen
or reconsider.244
11. The Varying Approaches of the Circuit Courts of Appeals
The aforementioned cases illustrate the lack of consistency in the
courts’ application of the departure bar and the recent trend among
the circuit courts of appeals of invalidating regulatory post-departure
bars. More importantly, the cases also highlight the nuances in
different circuit holdings of how narrowly or broadly the provisions
are interpreted. Such concerns indicate a need for change in this
context. The needed change, however, will require either a Supreme
Court ruling or an amendment to the INA’s statutory language.
VI. AN ARGUMENT FOR MODIFICATION OR ABOLISHMENT OF THE REGULATORY
DEPARTURE BAR
As evidenced throughout this Comment, there is a lack of
uniformity among the U.S. circuit courts of appeals’ departure bar
jurisprudence in the immigration context. Specifically, the circuit
courts are divided on the applicability and/or validity of the physical
presence requirement in the departure bars—these “[‘d]ifferences in
legal rules applied by the circuits result in unequal treatment of
citizens . . . solely because of differences in geography.’”245
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee (“Study
Committee”) examined inter-circuit conflicts and “recommended that
the Federal Judicial Center ‘study the number and frequency of
unresolved conflicts’ to determine how many were ‘intolerable.’”246
Sankar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 284 F. App’x 798 (11th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 799.
244 See Court Locator, supra note 195.
245 Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal
Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 206–07 (1975).
246 Id. (quoting JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U. S., FED. COURTS STUDY COMM’N, REPORT OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMISSION 124–25 (1990) [hereinafter FED. COURTS STUDY
COMM. REPORT]).
242
243
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The Study Committee’s report defined “intolerable” conflicts in the
court system to include circumstances when the lack of uniformity
“‘encourages forum shopping among circuits [or] creates unfairness to
litigants in different circuits . . . [or] ‘encourages non-acquiescence’ by
federal administrative agencies, by forcing them to choose between the
uniform administration of statutory schemes and obedience to the
different holdings of courts in different regions.’”247 Given these
guidelines, the current regulatory departure bar conflicts in the
different circuits are clearly “intolerable” conflicts.
Such longstanding conflicts are causes for concern, especially
considering the existence of Supreme Court Rule 10 (“Rule 10”), which
provides guidance for the Court’s discretionary power to choose which
writs of certiorari to grant.248 One guiding principle the Supreme Court
uses in considering a petition is whether a “[U.S.] court of appeals has
entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another [U.S.] court
of appeals on the same important matter.”249 Interestingly, at least one
commentator has said that Rule 10 is partly derived from former
President and Chief Justice Taft’s vision for the Supreme Court; a vision
that involved “two broad objectives: (i) to resolve important questions
of law, and (ii) to maintain uniformity in federal law.”250
Although one commentator has noted that maintaining uniformity
in federal law “has fallen by the wayside” since the retirement in 1993
of Justice White251—who openly advocated that a primary aim of the
Court is “to provide some degree of coherence and uniformity in
federal law throughout the land”252—it is still an objective the Court
generally adheres to. As Justice Scalia noted, “The principal purpose of
this Court’s exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction is to clarify the law.”253
Nonetheless, petitioning the Court to resolve an inter-circuit conflict

Id. (quoting FED. COURTS STUDY COMM’N REPORT at 124–25).
SUP. CT. R. 10.
249 Id. at R. 10(a).
250 Kenneth W. Star, The Supreme Court and its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of
William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2006) (emphasis added).
251 Id.; see Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: White Announces He’ll Step Down
From High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1993, at 1.
252 Byron R. White, The Work of the Supreme Court: A Nuts and Bolts Description, 54
N.Y. ST. B. J. 346, 349 (1982).
253 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2274 (2009) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see, e.g., Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 7 (2008) (“[The Court] granted
certiorari . . . to resolve the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals.”); Whorton v.
Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 415 (2007) (stating that the Court “granted certiorari to
resolve th[e] conflict” among courts of appeals and state supreme courts).
247
248
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does not guarantee that the petition will be granted, but the “likelihood
that the Court will grant review increases markedly.”254
Unfortunately, however, some conflicts among the circuits can
persist for years before the Supreme Court finally decides to hear the
matter.255 Specifically, in the departure bar context, the Supreme Court
has rejected certiorari in at least three cases since 2008.256 It is not
clear at this point whether the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to
clarify the matter at issue, especially since “relatively few immigration
cases are taken up by the Supreme Court.”257
Additionally, as noted above, lack of uniformity may lead parties,
both governmental entities as well as private parties, to engage in
forum shopping, and it certainly fosters less predictability in the law,
which raises questions of fundamental fairness concerning similarly
situated persons in different locations being treated differently under
the same laws.258 Such uncertainty also raises philosophical questions
about the overall effectiveness of our court system.259 Further,
uniform application of the law can improve judicial efficiency by
limiting the amount of resources that courts expend deciphering a
law’s applicability when different circuits have such varying
approaches to the same issue.
First, forum shopping is a practice that our courts greatly
despise.260 For this reason, courts are encouraged to “consider the
twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and

254 Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda:
Deciding to Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court, 57 KAN. L. REV. 313, 318
(2009) (citing David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks
in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 981–83 (2007) (illustrating that nearly
seventy percent of the certioraris granted in the 2003–2005 Terms involved an
intercircuit conflict).
255 See, e.g., Bryan M. Shay, Note, “So I Says to ‘the Guy,’ I Says . . .”: The
Constitutionality of Neutral Pronoun Redaction in Multidefendant Criminal Trials, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 365 (2006) (“This relatively even split in the circuits persisted
for almost twenty years until the Court finally got the chance to settle the debate . . . .”).
256 Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 502
(2010); Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
502 (2010); Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438 (1st Cir. 2007).
257 Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 27, at 49.
258 See supra text accompanying notes 23–27, 29.
259 For example, given the importance of maintaining uniformity throughout
American jurisprudence, as seen in the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution, should changes be made to the American court system so that such intercircuit conflicts do not persist for several years?
260 See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”261 Litigants,
however, may undertake such gamesmanship when the legal
environment provides them with the opportunity to receive a more
favorable outcome in a different jurisdiction.
Second, “[l]ack of predictability” is also of great concern; it is
“detrimental to citizens of foreign countries, citizens of the United
States, and to the United States as a country.”262 Such unpredictability
“may frustrate the reasonable expectations of litigants and lead to
disparate results across the states.”263 Instead, courts should strive to
achieve predictability because it “helps determine the precedent to
which a court should adhere, and it ‘encourage[s] reliance on
adjudication.’”264 In addition, predictability of the law can further
assist an attorney in advising clients and preparing clients’ cases.
Third, the current lack of uniformity leads to fundamental
unfairness in our legal system. As indicated throughout this Comment,
an alien who was subject to removal proceedings in state A may be
unable to file a motion to reopen his or her proceedings, but would be
permitted to do so if he or she had faced removal proceedings in State
B. This is not a situation in which state laws mandate a variation of
results because different states have different laws or word those laws
differently. Rather, this is a situation in which federal statutory law
and federal regulations are interpreted differently although the
language contained therein is the same. As a result, similarly situated
persons in different areas are not treated the same.
Finally, judicial efficiency may be improved by increasing
uniformity in this context. Courts may be able to save limited
resources by not having to decipher what exactly the law in each
circuit is or will be. Lower courts will have more guidance and clarity
to rule on issues pertaining to motions filed by departed aliens. The
BIA and immigration courts may also experience an improvement in
efficiency. As the BIA has explicitly indicated, it will apply the Fourth
Circuit’s interpretation of departure bar jurisprudence only in the
Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction. Thus, the BIA will continue to rely on its
own interpretation of the regulatory departure bars in other circuits.
This practice may lead to more cases being overturned—if the circuit
261 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448 n.2
(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 77–79.
262 Christina Manfredi, Comment, Waiving Goodbye to Personal Jurisdiction Defenses:
Why United States Courts Should Maintain a Rebuttable Presumption of Preclusion and
Waiver Within the Context of International Litigation, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 233, 258
(2008).
263 Id. at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted).
264 Id. at 256–57 (quoting Estabrook v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 283, 289 (1998)).
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does not agree with the BIA’s approach, as shown in Part VII—which
results in more litigation and greater use of resources. Absent a
Supreme Court ruling on the matter, in order to resolve these
concerns, Congress should modify the INA’s statutory language or
abolish regulatory departure bars entirely.
VII.

MODIFICATIONS AND AMENDMENTS

There are several different ways to modify or amend the language
in the regulatory departure bars as well as the relevant INA statutes.
This Part’s objective is to propose a modification or amendment that
will result in uniformity among the circuits. For illustrative purposes,
this Part will use the language contained in the departure bar under 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), which provides:
(d) Departure, deportation, or removal. A motion to reopen or a
motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a person
who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal
proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the United
States. Any departure from the United States, including the
deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion,
deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a
motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a
withdrawal of such motion.265

Similarly, this section will use the language contained in the INA
under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(C), which provides:
(c) Decision and burden of proof.
....
(7) Motions to reopen
(A) In general. An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings
under this section, except that this limitation shall not apply so as
to prevent the filing of one motion to reopen described in
subparagraph (C)(iv).
(B) Contents. The motion to reopen shall state the new facts that
will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and
shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.
(C) Deadline.

8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2011) (pertaining to the BIA); see § 1003.23(b)(1) (2011).
In general . . . A motion to reopen or to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of
a person who is the subject of removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings
subsequent to his or her departure from the United States. Any departure from the
United States, including the deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of
exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to
reopen or a motion to reconsider shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion.
Id. (pertaining to Immigration Court).
265
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(i) In general. Except as provided in this subparagraph, the motion
to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final
administrative order of removal.266

It is evident from the different circuit courts’ holdings that
modifying the regulatory departure bars will not resolve all of the
current conflicts.267 As previously indicated, the Second, Third, Fourth,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits hold that the BIA either cannot constrict its
congressionally-granted jurisdiction or that the regulatory departure
bars are rendered invalid by the clear language found within the
pertinent section(s) of the INA.268 Each of the circuits, however,
acknowledges that the INA’s statutory language is controlling.269 The
differences lie in how each circuit interprets this language. Therefore,
a realistic solution to the current conflicts, absent a Supreme Court
ruling directly on point, involves amending the INA’s statutory
language.
There are two possible modifications that are most reasonable in
this context: one that includes statutory language requiring a
geographic presence for all motions to reopen or one that includes
statutory language explicitly stating that no such geographic presence
is required. Beginning with the former, such an amendment could
include: (1) language contained in current regulatory departure bars,
in addition to explicit language to include (2) aliens who were the
subject of removal proceedings, (3) aliens who voluntarily departed
the country, and (4) aliens who involuntarily departed.
The
amendment could be structured as follows:
(7) Motions to reopen.
(A) In general. An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings
under this section, except that this limitation shall not apply so as
to prevent the filing of one motion to reopen described in
subparagraph (C)(iv).
(i) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to an alien who is the subject of
removal proceedings or was the subject of removal proceedings
wherein a final order had been issued subsequent to his or her
voluntary or involuntary departure from the United States. Any
departure from the United States, including the deportation or
removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or
removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen

266 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(C) (2006) (additional provisions under subsection
(C) omitted).
267 See discussion supra Part V.
268 Id.
269 Id.
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or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of such
motion.
....
(C) Deadline.
(i) In general. Except as provided in this subparagraph, the motion
to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final
administrative order of removal.

Although such statutory language would resolve the conflicts
among all of the circuit courts, it would be contrary to Congress’s
intent of improving the expedition of removing aliens in enacting the
IIRIRA.270 The court in Coyt explained that the IIRIRA “‘inverted’
certain provisions of the INA, encouraging prompt voluntary departure
and speedy government action, while eliminating prior statutory
barriers to pursuing relief from abroad.”271 The court continued by
explaining that prior to the IIRIRA “removal of a petitioner from the
United States precluded courts from exercising jurisdiction over
petitions for review.”272 Therefore, at the time when orders of final
removal were pending, aliens were granted automatic stays.273 The
“IIRIRA changed that by lifting the prior statutory bar over courts
exercising jurisdiction over departed aliens, removing the automatic
stay provision upon petition for review, and informing the Attorney
General that removal need not be deferred.”274 The court in Coyt then
concluded that “the intent of Congress is clear” in that when Congress
enacted the IIRIRA it “anticipated that petitioners would be able to
pursue relief after departing from the United States.”275

270 See Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Congress wished to
expedite the physical removal of those aliens not entitled to admission to the United
States, while at the same time increasing the accuracy of such determinations.”).
271 Id. (quoting Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1755 (2009)); see also Espinal v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 224 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting the “IIRIRA’s purpose of speeding
departure, but improving accuracy”); Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 101 (2d Cir. 2011)
(illustrating the same point as in Coyt by quoting the identical language from Nken).
272 Coyt, 593 F.3d at 906.
273 Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3) (repealed 1996).
274 Coyt, 593 F.3d at 906; see IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009,
3009-612
(1996)
(repealing
8 U.S.C. § 1105a); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(3)(B), 1252(b)(8)(C) (2006); see also Espinal,
653 F.3d at 224 (“Congress specifically withdrew the statutory post-departure bar to
judicial review.”).
275 Coyt, 593 F.3d at 906 (emphasis added); see also Luna, 637 F.3d at 101 (stating
that Congress has done nothing since enacting IIRIRA to indicate “that an alien’s
departure after filing a motion to reopen should be a jurisdictional bar”); Reyes-Torres
v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Coyt’s language regarding
Congress’s intent in enacting IIRIRA).
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Additional insights into the IIRIRA’s structural meanings were
discussed in William v Gonzales.276 The majority in William made clear
that Congress’s use of the term “alien” does not distinguish between
aliens within or without the country; that Congress enacted limitations
in the section at issue, but a geographical limitation for departed aliens
is not included; and that Congress’s explicit physical requirement
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV)277 would be rendered
superfluous if Congress already geographically limited motions to
reopen or reconsider for aliens.278 Therefore, the amendment
proposed above would be contrary to the IIRIRA’s original purpose.
Perhaps then the more appropriate method to resolve the lack of
uniformity without frustrating the IIRIRA’s purpose or congressional
intent would be an amendment to the statutory language that explicitly
states that an alien may file one motion to reopen whether he or she
(1) is the subject of or (2) was the subject of removal proceedings,
regardless of whether the alien (3) voluntarily or (4) involuntarily
departed the country. For example,
(7) Motions to reopen.
(A) In general. An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings
under this section, except that this limitation shall not apply so as
to prevent the filing of one motion to reopen described in
subparagraph (C)(iv).
(i) Subparagraph (A) shall apply to an alien who is the subject of
exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings or was the subject of
removal proceedings wherein a final order had been issued
subsequent to his or her voluntary or involuntary departure from the
United States. Any departure from the United States, including the
deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion,
deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a
motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall not constitute a
withdrawal of such motion.
....
499 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2007).
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV) (2006).
(iv) Special rule for battered spouses, children, and parents. Any limitation under this
section on the deadlines for filing such motions shall not apply.
....
(IV) if the alien is physically present in the United States at the time of filing the
motion.
278 William, 499 F.3d at 332–33; see also Espinal, 653 F.3d at 224 (providing similar
arguments in its reasons why “the post-departure bar regulation conflicts with
Congress’ clear intent”); Luna, 637 F.3d at 101 (discussing Congress’s explicit physical
presence requirement for the domestic violence section and how “Congress’s choice to
include this limitation in only one small subsection makes significant its decision to
omit such a requirement from the rest of the law”).
276
277
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(C) Deadline.
(i) In general. Except as provided in this subparagraph, the motion
to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final
administrative order of removal.

This approach would essentially abolish the regulatory departure
bar rule by explicitly stating in the INA’s statutory language that an
alien who files a motion to reopen or reconsider his or her immigration
proceedings is not be jurisdictionally barred from doing so solely due
to the alien’s geographic location. More importantly, such an
amendment could bring the needed uniformity in each circuit’s current
approach to the departure bar’s application in the immigration context.
To illustrate, the circuits that relied upon the Attorney General’s
discretionary power to issue regulations as the reason to render such
departure bars valid would no longer be able to uphold a BIA’s or an
IJ’s denial of a motion on such jurisdictional grounds.279 In addition,
the Ninth Circuit would no longer need to distinguish between aliens
who voluntarily departed the country and those who were
involuntarily removed.280 Furthermore, the Second, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits would now have clear guidance as to whether the BIA retains
jurisdiction to consider motions filed by aliens who have departed.281
Finally, the Third and Fourth Circuits could continue to uphold the
statute itself as the final word on whether a court has jurisdiction to
consider a motion to reopen filed by a departed alien.282 Ultimately,
this amendment or one that is similarly drafted would resolve each of
the current inter-circuit conflicts while also conforming to
congressional intent not to impose a geographic limitation.
Such an amendment would provide uniformity in this
immigration context that has been nonexistent for many years. “Given
that judicial efficiency and finality are important values,”283 the INA’s
statutory language should be amended to provide greater uniformity
in this immigration context by explicitly stating that an alien may file a
motion to reopen regardless of whether the alien resides inside or
outside of the United States. The longer departure bar jurisprudence
remains inconsistent, the longer certain parties may fall victim to the
279 See generally Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 2010); Toora v. Holder, 603
F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2010); Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2009); Sankar v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 284 F. App’x 798 (11th Cir. 2008); Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d
438 (1st Cir. 2007).
280 See generally Coyt, 593 F.3d 902.
281 See generally Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011); Pruidze v. Holder, 632
F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2011); Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2010).
282 See generally Espinal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2011); William v.
Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2007).
283 Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 197 (1996).
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concerns described in this Comment. Without a Supreme Court ruling
on this matter or a modification of the current law, the problems
detailed above will persist and aliens in certain jurisdictions will
continue to be removed without the possibility of having their cases
reheard.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As departure bar jurisprudence currently stands, aliens subject to
removal proceedings in different areas of the country will face
different outcomes, not based upon the merits of their cases, but solely
because of their geographic locations. Such lack of uniformity presents
problems in our legal system. This Comment has outlined a few of
these problems. One problem involves governmental agencies, as well
as private parties, engaging in forum shopping.284 Another problem,
which common sense dictates, is that such a non-uniform practice
leads to lack of predictability in the law. This is probably most
troublesome in circuits that have yet to directly address the departure
bar’s validity, as well as circuits where only unpublished,
nonprecedential decisions have been issued.285 An attorney advising
his or her client in these jurisdictions has greater difficulty predicting
what the outcome may be or how the court will interpret the laws that
are already in place. Our judicial system should strive to maintain a
framework devoid of such concerns.
An amendment to the INA’s statutory language explicitly stating
that physical presence is not required for departed aliens to file
motions to reopen their proceedings would provide the clarity that
circuit courts need in order to reach similar outcomes on identical
issues. As such, an amendment to the INA’s statutory language that
explicitly grants immigration courts the jurisdiction to consider an
alien’s motion to reopen, regardless of whether the alien is within or
without the country, would both provide uniformity among the
different circuit courts of appeals and remain true to the IIRIRA’s
statutory purpose of expediting removal proceedings “while
eliminating prior statutory barriers to pursuing relief from abroad.”286

284 See supra Part I (discussing how DHS officials subjected Mendiola to removal
proceedings in a different circuit’s jurisdiction in Mendiola); see also SKINNER, supra
note 27.
285 For a discussion of cases from circuits that have issued only nonprecedential
opinions regarding the departure bar, see discussion supra Part V.C.
286 Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2010).
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